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Civil Forfeiture of Real Property: The
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I. Introduction
The doctrine of forfeiture permits the United States Gov-
ernment to take property illegally used or acquired, without
compensating the owner.1 The doctrine is an ancient one that
has survived for thousands of years,2 yet it has traditionally
played an insignificant role in the government's struggle with
crime.3 Over the last two decades, however, Congress has revital-
ized forfeiture by enacting several provisions which have dra-
matically increased the scope of civil forfeiture.4 Most signifi-
1. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 2
(1987)[hereinafter DRUG GUIDE].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. In 1970, Congress initiated its expansion of forfeiture by enacting the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970 (1988)). Section 881 of this Act reads in part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transpor-
tation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in para-
graph (1) or (2), except that-
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this
section unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such
conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter
or subchapter II of this chapter; and (B) no conveyance shall be forfeited
under the provisions of this section by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person
other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the posses-
1
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cantly, and central to the thesis of this Comment, the statutory
reach of the government now extends to real property.'
The very nature of real property interests complicates the
application of the civil forfeiture doctrine. Several parties can
simultaneously hold an interest in a single parcel of real prop-
erty. When the illegal action of one interest holder subjects a
parcel of real property to forfeiture, the rights of the remaining
interest holders are jeopardized. The federal courts, in civil for-
feiture actions, are requiring interest holders who allege inno-
cence to show, among other things, that they did everything rea-
sonably possible to avoid the illegal use of the seized property.
As applied, this standard is impractical as it allows the govern-
ment to seize property on a showing of probable cause and ulti-
mately take title to the property, unless the interest holder chal-
lenging the forfeiture shoulders the heavy burden of innocence
that is mandated by the federal courts. As the government de-
ploys this new weapon in its war against drug traffickers, the
rights of innocent persons are getting caught in the cross fire.
The historical development of forfeiture, from the early
English common law until the adoption of the modern American
forfeiture statutes, is presented in Part II of this Comment. Part
sion of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or any State.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and
data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
In 1978, Congress amended this statute to permit the forfeiture of all monies used in
and all proceeds acquired from the illegal drug trade. Pub. L. No. 95-633, tit. III, § 301,
92 Stat. 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)). This is the first United States
statute to permit the civil forfeiture of the accumulated profits of a criminal activity.
DRUG GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1. In 1984, Congress again amended the civil forfeiture
provisions to allow forfeiture of real property used in connection with drug transactions.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 306, 98 Stat. 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)(1988)).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)(1988). This section subjects to forfeiture:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or im-
provements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to com-
mit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omisssion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
[Vol. 10:485
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II also discusses the origin of the innocent owner defense to civil
forfeiture - initially as enunciated by the Supreme Court, then
as legislated by Congress 7 - and the standard of proof neces-
sary to establish that defense." Finally, this section explores the
complications and concerns caused by the relation-back doc-
trine' and the issue of post-seizure interest.10 Part III analyzes
the similarities between civil and criminal forfeiture proceed-
ings, and concludes that a claimant in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing against real property should only be required to meet the
same standard of proof required for claimants in criminal forfei-
ture proceedings.
II. Background
A. Historical Development of the Concept of Forfeiture
1. English Law
The history of civil forfeiture stems from the concept of the
deodand in English law." The deodand was any personal chattel
6. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) (The
Court, in dicta, stated that it would be difficult to reject the claim of an owner who
"proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
of his property .... "). The defense alluded to in Calero-Toledo is generally termed the
innocent owner exception. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),(7) (1988).
8. The Supreme Court, in Calero-Toledo, created two requirements for the inno-
cent owner defense. See infra text accompanying note 62. This standard has been ap-
plied by the lower courts when interpreting the innocent owner exception to section 881.
See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988). This provision states that: "All right, title, and inter-
est in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States
upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." Id. This simply
means that at the moment of the illegal use of the property all rights and legal title to
the property pass to the government. DRUG GUIDE, supra note 1, at 159. Seizure and
formal proceedings simply confirm the forfeiture that has already taken place. Id.
10. The post-seizure interest issue generally arises when a claimant is the holder of
a security interest in the seized property and is entitled to interest until the maturity
date of the security instrument, but is denied any interest beyond the date of seizure.
See infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 388 (W.D. Mich. 1987). "Deo-
dand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, 'to be given to God.''" Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing, Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974). "The origins of the deodand are
traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that the
instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was required." 416 U.S. at
3
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which was used as the immediate instrument of death.1 2 When a
chattel was employed to cause a death, it was forfeited to the
Crown to be applied to charitable uses. 3 Our ancestors created
the concept of forfeiture out of a desire for revenge."' Over the
centuries, the theory that the doctrine serves a legitimate need
for revenge has gradually diminished, but the doctrine of forfei-
ture remains. 5 A more contemporary justification for forfeiture
is to punish and to deter crime."6
Forfeiture of chattels also resulted from conviction for felo-
nies and treason according to English common law.' The partic-
ular items subject to forfeiture were extended beyond the chat-
tel which occasioned the felony, to the entire estate of the
681. For a discussion of the history between these ancient laws and modern forfeiture
statutes, see Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169
(1973).
12. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. at 388 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed.
1979)) ("In English Law, [a deodand was] any personal chattel which was the immediate
occasion of the death of any reasonable creature, and which was forfeited to the crown to
be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by the higher almoner."). For further
explanation of the deodand concept, see infra note 21.
13. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. at 388.
14. DRUG GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3. The original focus of the revenge was directed
at the offending chattel, rather than at the owner.
15. Id.
16. Id. Congress recognized that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and pun-
ishment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable drug trade. H.R.
REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
3182, 3374 ("Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat... drug trafficking are to be
successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfei-
ture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made."). The Court in
Calero-Toledo discussed how the modern justification of forfeiture can develop.
The adaptation of the deodand institution to serve the more contemporary
function of deterrence is an example of a phenomenon discussed by Mr. Justice
Holmes: "The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a
formula. In the course of the centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears,
but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten,
and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some
ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and reconcile it with the
present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which
have been found for it and it enters on a new career. The old form receives a new
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has
received."
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-82 n.19 (1974) (citation
omitted).
17. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
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convicted felon. 8 The rationale for these forfeitures was that vi-
olation of the criminal law was a breach of the King's peace, and
this breach justified a denial of the right to own property. 9 In
addition, English law also provided for statutory forfeitures of
offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue
laws.20
2. Early American Law
Deodands did not become a part of the common law tradi-
tion of the United States.2 1 Nor has forfeiture of estates result-
ing from felony convictions been permitted.22 The concept of the
deodand, however, has been incorporated in modern notions of
liability.2 3 The government has been substituted for the church
18. Id. ("The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his land es-
cheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal,
to the Crown.").
19. Id.
20. Id. (These "statutory forfeitures [are] likely a product.., of the deodand tradi-
tion and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer. Statu-
tory forfeitures were most often enforced under the in rem procedure utilized in the
Court of Exchequer to forfeit the property of felons.").
21. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. At the base of the deodand doctrine was super-
stition. For example, if an ox-drawn cart were to break loose and kill its owner, the
implication was that the cart was evil because it caused the death. This cart then would
be a deodand for pious uses.
Needless to say, historians record that the "pious uses" under the control of the
king and his almoner became a scandal which moderns would describe as being
graft .... To the credit of American jurisprudence, from the outset the doctrine
was deemed to be so repugnant to our ideas of justice as not to be included as a
part of the common law of this country.
Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 514-15, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916).
22. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83. Forfeiture of estates was particularly ab-
horred by our founding fathers. The framers of the Constitution demonstrated their
repudiance of criminal forfeiture by including article III, section 3 in the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. This section forbade forfeiture of an estate because of a
criminal conviction. The only exception permitted forfeiture of a life estate for treason,
commonly considered the most heinous of crimes. Sinoway, Seizures of Houses and Real
Property Under Marijuana Forfeiture Laws, 14 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 113 (May
1987). For further discussion of abhorrance to forfeiture of estates, see United States v.
Reckmeyer, 628 F. Supp. 616, 619 (E.D. Va. 1986).
23. United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 388 (W.D. Mich. 1987). The
court here stated that the concept of the deodand had been transformed by historical
processes. Thus, a modern secular society has replaced the dynastic society, while the
underlying concept of forfeiture remains. Id.
5
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and the crown,24 and the forfeited property may be retained for
official use, sold, or destroyed,25 rather than applied to pious
uses.2" "Long before the adoption of the Constitution the com-
mon law courts in the Colonies - and later in the states during
the period of Confederation - were exercising jurisdiction in
rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes. '2 7 Almost immedi-
ately after the adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargo in-
volved in violations of the customs laws were subject to forfei-
ture under federal law.28
3. Twentieth Century Forfeiture Statutes
The enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated. Mod-
ern forfeiture statutes, both federal29 and state,"0 extend to vir-
tually any type of property that may be connected with a crimi-
nal enterprise.3 Specifically, in the drug-related arena, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970.32 In its ongoing crusade against the "growing men-
24. Id.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988). This section reads in part:
(1) Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the
Attorney General may-
(A) retain the property for official use or transfer the custody or ownership of any for-
feited property to any Federal, State, or local agency ....
(B) sell any forfeited property which is not required to be destroyed by law ....
Id.
26. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. at 388.
27. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1942), quoted in Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 683. An in rem action is a legal proceeding directed solely against property
and brought to determine the ownership of the defendant-property. DRUG GUIDE, supra
note 1, at 5. An in personam proceeding is brought against an individual and determines
his personal obligations, rights, duties or liabilities. Id.
28. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39,
47). Also subject to forfeiture were "vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign countries,
and somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country." Id. (citing Act of Mar.
2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426).
29. For more than 200 years, Congress has continued to pass civil in rem forfeiture
statutes for a wide range of property, including: conveyances, hazardous substances,
counterfeiting paraphernalia, obscene materials, firearms, and moonshine paraphernalia.
For a list of the relevant statutes subjecting these properties to forfeiture, see DRUG
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
30. For a thorough discussion of state forfeiture provisions, see DRUG GUIDE, supra
note 1, at A8-45.
31. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
32. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/12
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ace of drug abuse in the United States,""3 Congress, through sec-
tion 881 of this Act, has authorized civil forfeiture of drug re-
lated property, including raw materials, containers, aircraft,
vessels, and vehicles. 34 Also, under section 881(a)(6), "moneys,
negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value" are
subject to forfeiture.35 This provision extends to "all proceeds
traceable" to an illicit exchange of controlled substances.3 "
Congress subsequently extended the scope of forfeiture
when it amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. The amendment was a component of the Crime
Control Act of 1984." Title III of the Crime Control Act was
"designed to enhance the use of forfeiture ... as a law enforce-
ment tool in combatting . . . drug trafficking. 38 Congress' aim
was to attack the economic power bases of criminals, and forfei-
ture was believed to be the "mechanism through which such an
attack [could] be made.""s
The Crime Control Act established two significant amend-
ments to section 881.40 The first change added real property that
is used or intended to be used in a felony to the list of property
subject to civil forfeiture. 41 The second revision codified a well-
(1988)). Also enacted in the same year and for essentially the same purpose were the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941-44
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)), and Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
848 (1988)), which provide for in personam forfeiture. For a discussion of in personam
proceedings as compared to in rem actions, see supra note 27.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4567.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
36. Id.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1988)).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374.
39. Id. The legislative history of the Crime Control Act explains that both Congress
and the law enforcement community recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of
fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade
in dangerous drugs. Id. The history then provides comment on a report released in April
1981 by the General Accounting Office which concludes, in part, that since the enact-
ment of the federal forfeiture statutes in 1970, the federal government's record in taking
the profit out of drug trafficking was far below Congress' expectations. Id.
40. Id. at 3398.
41. Id. This provision was codified at § 881(a)(7) (1988). For the text of this provi-
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established principle of law called the relation-back doctrine."2
This doctrine provides that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in
property [which is subject to civil forfeiture] vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
. .. .,, Therefore, when property is used during the course of
illegal drug transactions, or derived as a result of such transac-
tions, all rights to that property transfer immediately to the gov-
ernment regardless of when the property is actually seized."
The relation-back doctrine, as applied to the forfeiture of real
property, has created substantial conflicts and concerns for per-
sons who obtained an interest in property subsequent to its ille-
gal use."
B. Forfeiture Procedures
A civil forfeiture action is an in rem suit against the seized
property." The property in an in rem action is proceeded
against and held guilty as though it were a person by resorting
to a legal fiction. 7 The government does not have to convict or
even charge the owner of the seized property with a crime be-
cause civil forfeiture is independent of any criminal
proceedings. 8
The procedures of forfeiture are governed by customs law."
The government has the initial burden of establishing that prob-
sion, see supra note 5. It is interesting to note that even before the enactment of section
881(a)(7) in 1984, at least two courts had found that section 881(a)(6) covered real prop-
erty as proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. See United States v. Premises Known as
8584 Old Brownsville Rd., 736 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Certain
Real Property Situated at Route 3, 568 F. Supp. 434, 436 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
43. Id.
44. See supra note 9.
45. See infra notes 125-57 and accompanying text.
46. For a definition of an in rem action, see supra note 27.
47. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931). "It is
the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and
condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate . Id. at 579.
48. DRUG GUIDE, supra note 1, at 30.
49. The federal forfeiture statute incorporates by reference the well-established pro-
cedures of the customs statutes. Section 881(d) provides in pertinent part:
"(d) The provisions of law related to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeitures
• . . for violation of the customs laws ... shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred
* . . under the provisions of this subchapter . These procedures are set forth in 19
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1618 (1988).
[Vol. 10:485
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able cause exists to connect the property with the commission of
a federal drug felony.50 The government's burden has been judi-
cially interpreted to require a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve there is a substantial connection between the property to
be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by statute. 1 Such
belief must be grounded on more than mere suspicion but need
not rise to a level of prima facie proof.52
C. Establishment of the Innocent Owner Defense
Historically, after probable cause was established, the only
remedy for a person with an interest in property forfeited under
any federal statute was to petition the Attorney General of the
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). "In all suits or actions . . . brought for the forfeiture of
any [property] seized . . . where the property is claimed by any person, the burden of
proof shall lie upon such claimant . . . [pJrovided, That [sic] probable cause shall be
shown first for the institution of such suit or action .... Id.
51. The substantial connection standard has been consistently applied to the proba-
ble cause requirement for the forfeiture of real property. See United States v. Real Prop-
erty Containing 30.80 Acres, 665 F. Supp. 422 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Certain Lots in Vir-
ginia Beach, 657 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Va. 1987); United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of
Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La. 1987); United States v. Various Parcels of
Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1986). In personal property cases, however, a
variety of standards have been applied. For cases applying the substantial connection
standard to personal property, see United States v. $38,000, 816 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.
1987); United States v. $64,000, 722 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. One 1979
Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldo-
rado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1980 Ford Mustang, 648 F.
Supp. 1305 (N.D. Ind. 1986). For a case requiring a lesser standard defined as a connec-
tion which exists between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity, see
United States v. $128,035, 628 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 806 F.2d 262
(6th Cir. 1986). For cases requiring a standard where the property subject to forfeiture
must be used in any manner related to the illegal activity, see United States v. Little Al,
712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d
725 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983) (rejecting the substantial connec-
tion standard in matters concerning the forfeiture of vehicles); United States v. One 1979
Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1977 Cadillac
Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. 30.80 Acres, 665 F. Supp. at 424. See Certain Lots in Virgina Beach, 657 F.
Supp. at 1065 (suggestion by undercover agent to meet at the house to complete a drug
transaction was insufficient to establish a substantial connection between the property
and the illegal activity). Prima facie evidence is: "[Sluch evidence as, in the judgment of
the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain suffi-




United States for remission or mitigation.5 3 Although innocent
interest holders could not prevent forfeiture of their interest,
they could by this procedure request that the Attorney General
exercise his discretion and return part or all of the property be-
cause of mitigating circumstances. 4
1. The Supreme Court Approach to the Innocent Owner
Defense
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 5 recognized a need for statutory relief for
innocent interest holders.5s In Calero-Toledo, the lessor of a
yacht challenged the constitutionality of Puerto Rico's civil for-
feiture statutes which were modeled after section 881. 57 These
statutes permitted seizure and forfeiture of a yacht leased to in-
dividuals who used it to transport marijuana.58 The Court held
that the application of the statute to forfeit the lessor's interest
in the yacht was constitutional even though no innocent owner
defense was provided by the statute.59 Because Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., the lessor, voluntarily entrusted the lessees with
possession of the yacht and offered no proof that it did all it
reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an illegal
use, the property became subject to forfeiture.0° The Court, in
dicta, recognized a need to protect innocent interest holders and
53. DRUG GUIDE, supra note 1, at 228. Remission is considered to be a form of par-
don. Because there is no legal right to a pardon there is no legal right to a remission of
forfeiture. Thus, the granting of a remission is "purely a matter of grace." Id. at 214.
Mitigation is the granting of a pardon on the condition that the petitioner pay a penalty
for the return of his property. Id. at 228.
54. For a thorough discussion of the remission and mitigation procedures, see DRUG
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 214-34.
55. 416 U.S. 661 (1974).
56. Id. at 688-90.
57. The applicable forfeiture provisions of the Code of Puerto Rico provide that:
"All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property [shall be subject to forfeiture to the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico]." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 (1979 & Supp. 1988). For-
feited property may be sold at auction, set aside for official use, or destroyed. Id.
58. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 690. Thus, application of the statute was constitutional as applied to Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co. because it was not found to be an innocent owner.
[Vol. 10:485
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consequently announced an exception to the general rule that
property could be forfeited simply because it was related to a
criminal activity.6 1 The Court stated that a valid defense to for-
feiture would be raised if a claimant could prove: first, that he
was uninvolved in and unaware of the illegal activity; and sec-
ond, that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the wrongful use of his property.2
2. The Statutory Approach to the Innocent Owner
Defense
In 1978, Congress followed the Supreme Court's lead and
established a statutory exception to forfeiture by amending sec-
tion 881 to provide for an innocent owner defense.6 3 This
amendment provides that no property shall be forfeited by rea-
son of any act or omission committed without the knowledge or
consent of the owner." Thus, after probable cause is established
by the government, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is
not subject to forfeiture. 5 Because of the similarities between
61. Id. at 689.
62. Id. at 688-90; see supra note 6. The second requirement that claimant had done
everything reasonably possible to prevent the proscribed use of his property has created
conflicting duties that have been imposed upon claimants by the lower federal courts.
See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
63. Pub. L. No. 95-633, tit. III, § 301, 92 Stat. 3777 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),(7) (1988)).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),(7) (1988). The term "owner" should be broadly inter-
preted to include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the prop-
erty seized. Joint House-Senate Explanation, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
9496, 9522. The terms "owner," "claimant" and "interest holder" are used inter-
changeably in this Comment.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),(7) (1988). An owner must establish innocence by showing
that the illegal act was "committed or omitted without [his] knowledge or consent." Id.
The plain wording of the innocent owner section of the statute makes it clear that the
burden is on the claimant to prove his/her innocence: "[E]xcept that no property shall
be forfeited ... by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." Id.
The practice of shifting the burden of proof onto property owners in an in rem
forfeiture first appeared in seventeenth-century England when Parliament passed
the Navigation Acts ....
Forfeiture laws in the new American republic followed their English counter-
parts. Congress immediately adopted the practice of shifting the burdens in cus-
toms law forfeitures. The practice of shifting the burden gradually caught on in
other proceedings as well, and eventually became an integral part of the jurispru-
1990]
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the statute involved in Calero-Toledo and the federal forfeiture
statute,"0 the two requirements that were alluded to in Calero-
Toledo67 have been applied by the lower courts when interpret-
ing the innocent owner defense clause of the federal forfeiture
statute.68 For example, although Calero-Toledo involved forfei-
ture of personal property, the court in United States v. One
Single Family Residence9 applied the Calero-Toledo standard
to the forfeiture of real property under the federal statute.70 In
One Single Family Residence, the claimant asserted that the
mortgage interest in the house which had been taken as security
for a bail bond was not subject to forfeiture.71 The court studied
an Eleventh Circuit opinion72 that had discussed both of the
Calero-Toledo requirements.73 Ultimately, the court followed
the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and analyzed both elements of
the Calero-Toledo standard. 4
dence of in rem forfeiture law.
Comment, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Pro-
ceedings Arising out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822, 825-26 (footnotes
omitted).
66. The relevant similarities between the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico,
P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 ( 1979 & Supp. 1988), see supra note 57, and the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988), see supra note
4, are that both statutes subject the same types of property to forfeiture "if used or
intended for use" in illegal activity, and both statutes provide for similar disposition of
the property forfeited. P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 (1979 & Supp. 1988); 21 U.S.C. §
881 (1988).
67. For the two requirements that established the standard for the burden of proof,
see supra text accompanying note 62.
68. See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.
Fla. 1988). After referring to other cases that have applied the Calero-Toledo dicta, this
court concluded that both Calero-Toledo requirements must be established to reach in-
nocent owner status. Id. at 788.
69. 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
70. Id. at 788.
71. Id. at 785.
72. United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1056 (1986).
73. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held against the claimant because he failed to
satisfy the first requirement that he had no knowledge of the illegal activity. Id.
74. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. at 788.
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D. The Standard of Proof for Real Property Claimants
1. The Calero-Toledo Dicta
The application of the Calero-Toledo dicta to the forfeiture
of real property has created numerous inconsistencies in the du-
ties imposed upon interest holders. 5 The Supreme Court, in
Calero-Toledo, stated that forfeiture provisions as applied to
"lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any
wrongdoing,... may have the desirable effect of inducing them
to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their prop-
erty. '76 This statement is an unreasonably harsh and impractical
comment, particularly since the lower courts have traditionally
disfavored forfeiture." Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Calero-Toledo did not explain what an interest holder must do
to exercise greater care in the numerous types of real property
transactions that create interests which can be subjected to for-
feiture proceedings. 78 For instance, a mortgage lender located in
75. For example, in One Single Family Residence, the court rejected the claimant's
allegation that since it had no actual knowledge of the illegal activity, the property could
not be forfeited. 683 F. Supp. at 788-89. The court required the claimant to meet a
higher standard and prove that it was reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture. Id. The court additionally required the claimant to prove
that it did everything reasonably possible to prevent the proscribed use of the property.
Id. In contrast, in United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp.
1534 (E.D. La. 1987), the court found the mortgagee to be an innocent owner merely on a
showing that the mortgagee was unaware of the illegal source of the funds used to
purchase the property. Id. at 1541.
76. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 661, 688 (1974). Although the Court expressly referred
only to lessors, bailors and secured creditors, it did so due to the nature of the facts of
this case. Subsequently, the lower federal courts have extended this duty of greater care
to all interest holders. See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
77. United States v. One Rockwell Aero Commander, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir.
1982) (forfeiture has long been disfavored by the common law and should only be en-
forced when within both the spirit and the letter of the law); United States v. Edwards,
368 F.2d 722, 724 (4th Cir. 1966)(forfeiture statutes were not designed to punish without
fault); United States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 535 F. Supp. 65, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(forfeitures are not favored and a statute should be strictly construed to mitigate the
harshness).
78. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688. When the Supreme Court, in Calero-Toledo,
referred to the "desirable effect of inducing [interest holders] to exercise greater care," it
cited United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 238-41 (1939)(Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), as authority which supports this proposition. In One Ford Coach, Justice Douglas,
joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter, stated that an automobile finance company
had a duty to reasonably investigate purchasers to determine if the purchasers were in
reality strawmen for bootleggers. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. at 238. The dissent believed
13
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California which holds a mortgage on Florida property may have
different duties from a Florida bank with a mortgage on prop-
erty in Florida. Similarly, a third party with notice of past or
current illegal activity may have an affirmative duty to act with
greater care, but a party with no notice may not have such a
duty.79 The Supreme Court's mention of greater care leaves in-
terest holders with a potential legal duty and little clarification
of how this duty will be defined.80
2. The Lower Federal Courts
The lower federal courts, working within the confines of the
Calero-Toledo dicta, have attempted to clarify the legal duties
of the innocent owner.81 In United States v. A Fee Simple Par-
cel of Real Property,82 Pan America Bank, N.A. granted a mort-
gage on real property which was subsequently found to have
been purchased with proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 3
The Bank did not request a personal financial statement from
the titleholder because the title search and abstract review indi-
cated that the titleholder owned the property in fee simple. 4
Additional reasons for not requesting a financial statement were
that the Bank had no previous legal problems with the owner
and the loan was fully secured by collateral.8 5 The court found
Pan America to be an innocent owner with a valid claim to the
property in forfeiture proceedings under the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 6 The court held that
that a requirement for reasonable investigation was not an excessive'burden and "would
add but imperceptibly if at all to the cost of doing business." Id. at 241.
79. United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28, No. 85-6348 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
11, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). ("[P]reventive action is only required when
there is actual or constructive notice of potential wrongdoing fairly imputable to the
vehicle owner."). See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
80. The only clarification of this duty was the Court's reference, without elabora-
tion, to the dissent in One Ford Coach. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
81. See, e.g., United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28, No. 85-6348 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (discussing the difficulty of apply-
ing the Calero-Toledo dicta).
82. 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La. 1987).
83. Id. at 1540.
84. Id. at 1539.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1541. The Bank, however, asked for interest from the date of seizure. The
[Vol. 10:485
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Pan America had no actual or constructive knowledge of any in-
volvement of the property with illegal activities.17 "The Bank's
failure to obtain a personal financial statement from [the title-
holder] is insufficient to establish any knowledge of the illegal
activity giving rise to the tainted money used to purchase the
[property]."s
The significant factors in the court's analysis were an ab-
sence of any legal problems or suspicious transactions in the
mortgagor's banking history, and that the procedures which the
Bank utilized in extending the loan were "consistent with past
practices."8 9 Pan America's past relationship and dealings with
this borrower were used as the standard to show that it was not
aware of the illegal source of the funds used to purchase the
mortaged property.90 Thus, although the court did not require
proof of greater care in order for the Bank to establish itself as
an innocent owner, this determination was fact-sensitive and
will not automatically apply to all mortgage loan cases.91 It does
give some insight, however, to the factors that a court may find
to be relevant to an innocent owner analysis.92
Other real property forfeiture cases which have examined
the actions of interest holders have ranged from one in which
the court could easily conclude that the claimant had knowledge
of the illegal activities occurring on the property, such as in
United States v. Real Property Containing 30.80 Acres,93 to sit-
uations in which the claimant's assertions of innocence were not
court held that a lienholder is not entitled to post-seizure interest, attorneys' fees, or
other charges that may be permitted under a mortgage note. Id. For a discussion of the
issue of post-seizure interest, see infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
87. 650 F. Supp. at 1539.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1541.
90. Id.
91. For instance, a claimant who dealt with a party for the first time may have a
greater duty than Pan America did in A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F.
Supp. at 1534. This increased duty is what the Supreme Court alluded to in Calero-
Toledo when it referred to "greater care." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
92. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. at 1539 (based on the facts
that the Bank followed the same procedure that it had with an earlier loan (with the
wrongdoer) and that it was paid back in the ordinary course of business, the court found
the bank to be an innocent owner).
93. 665 F. Supp. 422 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Reynolds, 856




even challenged, such as in United States v. Real Property Ti-
tled in the Name of Shashin, Ltd.14 In 30.80 Acres, the claim-
ant's husband was involved in a conspiracy to distribute co-
caine.5 The claimant lived in the house on the subject property
while various incidents of cocaine trafficking occurred in her
kitchen and bedroom.9 6
The claimant testified that she was "overwrought with sus-
picions that her husband was having an affair and that this con-
cern, in effect, blinded her to realities .... "9 The court held
that it simply could not accept this assertion, "particularly in
the light of the testimony of [the government's witness] that the
claimant delivered to him, upon instructions from her husband,
a quantity of cocaine and money secreted in a briefcase to secure
the premises in case of a search by law enforcement officers."98
Factors relevant to the defeat of the claimant's innocent owner
defense included her proximity to the illegal actions as well as
her questionable role in the conspiracy."9 This case presents a
clear example of when an innocent owner claim will be
unsuccessful.
At the other end of the spectrum is United States v. Real
Property Titled in the Name of Shashin, Ltd. 00 Here the
claimant was the holder of a mortgage on property which was
subject to forfeiture.' 0 ' The claimant submitted uncontradicted
allegations that he had no knowledge of, nor did he assent to,
any illegal drug transactions on the property. 102 The court held
that in the absence of any contradictory allegations, the claim-
ant's affidavit must be taken as true.'03 Thus, the claimant was
an innocent owner and had a valid defense to the forfeiture of
94. 680 F. Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987). See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying
text.
95. 30.80 Acres, 665 F. Supp. at 426.
96. Id. at 426-27.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Id. at 428.
99. Id. The court concluded that the claimant had knowledge of the illegal activity.
A review of the findings of fact indicates that the court based its conclusion on: 1) the
ongoing transactions in the house where the claimant lived; and 2) the delivery of a
suitcase filled with cocaine by the claimant to the government's witness. Id. at 426-27.
100. 680 F. Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987).
101. Id. at 333.
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the mortgage principal.10 4 Although this case is a positive prece-
dent for uncontested innocent owner claims, the problem of
showing that one did everything reasonably possible to avoid the
illegal use still exists for the numerous claims that are
contested.105
E. Analogous Application of the Standards of Proof for Per-
sonal Property Forfeitures
Since forfeiture of real property is a recent development,
and since the Calero-Toledo standard has been applied to both
personal property and real property cases, the courts have
looked to personal property cases for guidance when applying
section 881 to real property.10 6 Generally, in personal property
cases, the courts have interpreted the Calero-Toledo standard
for innocent owners to require affirmative steps only when the
claimant has a reason to suspect that the property will be used
in violation of the law.10 7 In most cases in which an affirmative
duty to do everything reasonably possible to avoid the illegal use
has been required, the factual setting has established either ac-
tual or constructive notice of a potential for illegal use.10 In
104. Id. In addition, the court here allowed post-seizure interest, disagreeing with
United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La.
1987).
105. Additional problems of contested innocent owner claims are discussed infra
notes 125-57.
106. See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788
(S.D. Fla. 1988)(holding that the burden of proof for real property claimants was gov-
erned by the two requirements established by Calero-Toledo).
107. United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28, No. 85-6348 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
11, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (claimant who loaned his car to a family
friend did not have to act affirmatively because there was no reason to suspect wrongdo-
ing); United States v. One Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1986)(father
who allowed daughter to use his automobile had no duty to act because his daughter had
no criminal record); United States v. One 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 625
F. Supp. 893, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 853 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1988)(forfeiture denied
because there was no showing that lessee of boat had a questionable background that
would cause the lessor to suspect wrongdoing); United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cou-
gar XR-7, 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (forfeiture denied where claimant had
no reason to suspect her boyfriend would use her car to sell heroin).
108. United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985)(claim-
ant had constructive notice because he loaned plane in area where drug trafficking
through the use of private aircraft flourished); United States v. One Mercedes Benz, 604
F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985)(claimant had
17
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United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28,"°9 the claim-
ant, who entrusted his automobile to a friend, took no affirma-
tive steps to prevent the subsequent illegal use of his automo-
bile.110 There was no evidence that the claimant was involved in
the wrongful activity or aware of it."' The government, however,
contended that the second part of the Calero-Toledo test, that
the claimant do all that reasonably could be expected, had not
been met." 2
The court, in One 1985 Chevrolet, rejected the government's
contention and held that the claimant does not have to act af-
firmatively to prohibit an illegal use of his property unless there
is an apparent reason to suspect illegality." There was no rea-
son for suspicion here because the user of the automobile was a
family friend who had borrowed the car on several previous oc-
casions." The court discussed the difficulty of applying the re-
quirements for an innocent owner defense as set forth in Calero-
Toledo because these requirements suggest an affirmative duty
to act, whereas ignorance of wrongdoing is a passive condition." 5
Accordingly, the court found that the Calero-Toledo require-
ment could be satisfied here even though the claimant did not
act affirmatively to prevent a wrongful use of his property." 6
The court held that preventive action is only required when
there is actual or constructive notice of potential illegality, and
that this notice was not present here because the wrongdoer was
constructive notice because party to whom claimant entrusted automobile had prior
criminal record); United States v. One Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, 447 F. Supp. 1053,
1065 (M.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Ea Shipping Co. v. Bazemore, 617 F.2d 136 (5th
Cir. 1980)(claimant had knowledge because vessel had been taken to remote area of Co-
lumbia well-known for drug-related activities and had been assessed penalties for drug-
related activities on two previous occassions).




113. Id. The court noted here that the government had not apprised the court of
what the claimant should have done, even when the court directly addressed this ques-
tion to the government. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. "The question becomes whether doing nothing is reasonable behavior under
the circumstances. The answer is yes. The average person loaning a vehicle to a trusted
Family Friend would do no more that what was done here." Id.
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a trusted family friend. 117
The holdings that a claimant does not have an affirmative
duty to act to prevent criminal use of personal property unless
there is a suspicion of wrongdoing may, at first glance, seem to
elucidate the innocent owner defense requirements for both per-
sonal and real property cases. On further analysis, however,
these holdings seem to apply only to the particular case and
thus do not establish firm guidelines."' 8 For example, the courts
have held that the level of inquiry for the lending of an airplane
is "fundamentally different than that of a car" because a car is a
"common mode of transportation freely borrowed and lent in
our society."' 19 Moreover, a strict application of these holdings
could give constructive knowledge to a lender taking a mortgage
in southern Florida simply because the land is located in "an
area known for drug trafficking."1 0
The practical consequences of these interpretations will
most likely result in a decrease in the number of mortgages
granted in an area known for drug trafficking. This result di-
rectly conflicts with the idealization espoused in Calero-Toledo
that interest holders will exercise greater care over the supervi-
sion of their collateral.' 2 ' "This is a burden that is probably too
time consuming and expensive to meet. What will probably hap-
pen is that lenders will ... rely on their instincts, which will be
to the detriment of poor and minority borrowers and also eco-
nomically depressed areas."' 22 In United States v. One 1983
Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda,23 the court denied forfei-
ture, noting that "provisions which serve to encourage owners to
take the necessary precautionary measures ... are not designed
to immobilize all transferences of property . 124
117. Id.
118. Id. "[W]hat one 'reasonably could be expected to do to prevent criminal use of
property is a standard that must be tailored to individual circumstances.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
119. Id.
120. United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 F.2d 947, 951 (4th Cir. 1985).
The fact that an aircraft was leased in southern Florida was a major factor in a finding of
constructive notice of the potential for illegal use. Id.
121. Boyd, New Real Estate Forfeiture Laws, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1988, at 2, col. 5.
122. Id.
123. 625 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 858 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1988).




F. Complication of the Issue by the Relation-Back Doctrine
The issue of the standard of proof necessary to formulate an
innocent owner defense is complicated further by the relation-
back doctrine of the civil forfeiture statute. 125 This doctrine con-
veys title to the United States from the date of the illegal act
rather than from the date of seizure. 12 6 Thus, because forfeiture
actually occurs at the moment of illegal use, numerous courts
have held that no third party can acquire a legally recognizable
interest in the property after the occurrence of the activity that
subjects it to forfeiture.127 "Indeed, under a literal application of
[the relation-back doctrine], the interest of innocent third par-
ties would be cut off at the date of the violation ... rather than
at the date of the seizure. ''28 Thus, Congress' codification of this
common law doctrine comes into direct conflict with the inno-
cent owner provision in situations where the innocent claimant
acquired an interest subsequent to the illegal act.'29
1. Recent Judicial Applications of the Relation-Back Pro-
vision to Defeat Innocent Owner Standing
The relation-back doctrine has been applied to defeat the
standing of a claimant asserting a property interest that did not
predate the right to forfeiture declared by the United States.
For example, in United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate
125. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h)(1988). See supra note 9 for the text of this provision.
126. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
127. Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir.
1960)(illegal use of automobile vested title in the government at the time of the illegal
act and cut off all subsequent property rights); United States v. One Parcel of Real Es-
tate Property, 660 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1987)(les-
sees of camp did not have legal interest because it arose after the date of the wrongful
act); United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232, 249 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd
sub nom. In re One 1985 Nissan 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989)(all rights and title
vested in the government upon the commission of the illegal acts and thus the govern-
ment owned the property before the four children of the owner ever became heirs);
United States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983)(title
to property used in violation of the law transferred to the government from the date of
the illegal act and a subsequent decree of forfeiture merely confirms the forfeiture that
has already taken place). A
128. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp at 725.
129. See One Parcel of Real Estate Property, 660 F. Supp. at 487; Miscellaneous
Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. at 249.
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Property,' ° the claimants were lessees of property known as the
Rod and Reel Fish Camp. ' The lessor had received title to the
property for the sole purpose of preventing seizure by the gov-
ernment because the property was being used as a loading site
for marijuana.132 The wrongful act subjecting the property to
forfeiture was "its intended use in a drug smuggling operation in
July 1979 and/or the use of the proceeds of drug smuggling to
purchase the property. Accordingly, the forfeiture occurred, and
title to the property vested in the United States in 1979."' 3 The
lease upon which the claimants relied to establish their property
interest was not executed until 1984.13" The United States seized
the Camp in 1985 and thus caused title to vest retroactively in
1979.35 The court held that the claimants, although alleging in-
nocence as to the lessor's activities, lacked any cognizable inter-
est in the subject property necessary to confer standing to con-
test the forfeiture action. '36 "Seizure and a subsequent decree of
forfeiture merely confirms the forfeiture that has already taken
place.'1 37 Thus, the court granted summary judgment against
the claimants and allowed the relation-back doctrine to defeat
any possible innocent owner defense.3 8
The relation-back provision was also used to defeat stand-
ing to contest forfeiture in United States v. Miscellaneous Jew-
elry.1 39 The claimants in this case were the heirs to property
that was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).' 4 ° The
property consisted of over one million dollars in cash, two large
checks, two pieces of real estate, miscellaneous jewelry, and elec-
tronic equipment."' The heirs' father, who was a drug smuggler
and the purchaser of the property, died just prior to the filing of
130. 660 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1987).
131. Id. at 485.
132. Id.






139. 667 F. Supp. 232 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd sub nom. In re One 1985 Nissan 300ZX,
889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989).





the forfeiture complaint. 42 Although the court considered the
heirs to be innocent parties, it held that under the relation-back
doctrine the property was actually forfeited to the government
at the time the heirs' father purchased it with drug proceeds. 143
Accordingly, the property could not be considered part of the
decedent father's estate and the heirs had no recognizable legal
interest in the forfeited property."" The court rejected the
claimants' contention that application of the relation-back pro-
vision in this manner is inconsistent with the innocent owner
defense provision. 5 The court stated that the innocent owner
provision of section 881, in light of the relation-back doctrine,
protects only the interest of an innocent party acquired before
the date of the illegal act.1 48
Within the factual setting of Miscellaneous Jewelry, in
which the claimants were the children of a drug smuggler seek-
ing to inherit the fruits of his illegal activity, it is understanda-
ble why the court refused to recognize their interest. The court's
reasoning, however, becomes troublesome when applied to other
types of innocent claimants who have no relationship to the
wrongdoers, such as the lessees of the fishing camp in One Par-
cel of Real Estate Property.47
2. Rejection of the Relation-Back Doctrine
A positive development involving the relation-back doctrine
issue is the decision of the federal district court in United
States v. One Single Family Residence.148 This court rejected
the government's argument that the relation-back doctrine cuts
off the rights of an innocent mortgagee who acquired its interest
after the illegal act.149 One Single Family Residence is the first
decision in which a court considered the application of the rela-
tion-back provision to a lienholder and concluded that the inno-
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. at 247.
144. Id. at 249.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 247.
147. 660 F. Supp. 483, 486 (S.D. Miss.), aft'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1987).
148. 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
149. Id. at 787.
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cent owner provision must prevail.165 The mortgagee in this case,
although subsequently not found to be an innocent owner, was
permitted to present its claim of innocent ownership.' 5'
The court in One Single Family Residence addressed a va-
riety of factors in its consideration of the issue of whether a
claimant "may seek shelter under the innocent owner exception
to section 881 even though his purported property interest did
not arise until after that property was used in or derived from
an illegal drug transaction.'1 The court first referred to the
criminal forfeiture statute'53 to demonstrate that "Congress cer-
tainly has not per se precluded bona fide purchasers from avoid-
ing the relation-back doctrine."' 54 The relation-back doctrine is
codified in the criminal forfeiture section, but the section goes
on to exempt any otherwise forfeitable property which is trans-
ferred to a person other than the defendant, if the transferee is a
"bona fide purchaser for value ... who at the time of purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture under this section.' 55
The court also concluded that the legislative history of the
innocent owner provision of section 881 was evidence that this
provision protects individuals whose interests arose subsequent
to the illegal act giving rise to forfeiture.'5 6 Additionally, the
court pointed out that the term "proceeds" under section
881(a)(6) "necessarily bear[s] the imprimatur of a prior illegal
150. Id. at 788. Other courts have upheld the mortgagee's interest, but without con-
sidering the relation-back doctrine. See United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real
Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (E.D. La. 1987).
151. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. at 783.
152. Id. at 786.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). For the relevant text of this statute, see infra note 192.
154. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. at 787. In section 853(c) of the
criminal forfeiture statute, Congress codified both the relation-back doctrine and an in-
nocent owner exception. Thus, the court concluded that innocent owners must be ex-
empt from relation-back. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. For example, the court noted that Senator Culver commented that the orig-
inal language of the innocent owner provision "is modified in order to protect the indi-
vidual who obtains ownership of proceeds with no knowledge of the [original] transac-
tion." Similarly, the court pointed out Senator Nunn's explanation of the exception,
which was "to make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to
the property he owns having been derived from an illegal transaction" would be able to




drug transaction . . and thus a subsequent transferee must be
entitled to assert the innocent owner defense."' 57
3. The Title Insurance Industry Concerns
The application of the relation-back doctrine to defeat the
standing of an innocent owner, such as the decisions in One Par-
cel of Real Estate Property and Miscellaneous Jewelry, is the
cause of much concern. 5 a The American Land Title Association,
a Washington, D.C., based group, is the national trade associa-
tion of the land title industry.'59 The principal function of this
industry is to facilitate the sure and efficient transfer of title to
real estate by ascertaining and insuring the rights of purchasers,
mortgage lenders, and others involved in these transactions. 6 '
Accordingly, the members of the national trade association have
an interest in the certainty and predictability of the laws affect-
ing title to and interest in real estate, as well as the proper inter-
pretation and administration of such laws.'
In a report issued by the General Accounting Office, a con-
cern of the title insurance industry is expressed over the degree
to which innocent parties, such as mortgage lenders, are pro-
tected in the government's application of the relation-back pro-
visions."' Essentially, the industry is concerned that if an inno-
cent lender issues a mortgage on a property after the date of the
157. Id. at 788.
158. Boyd, New Real Estate Forfeiture Laws, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
For a general discussion of land title issues relating to forfeiture, see Sherris, Drug Re-
lated Forfeitures Land Title Issues, Jan./Feb. 1990 PROB. & PROP. 33.
159. Asset Forfeiture Programs: Corrective Actions Underway But Additional Im-
provements Needed: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988)(statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Associate Director, General Government Division)
[hereinafter Hearings].
160. See D. BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE (1986), for a general discussion of the
title insurance industry.
161. Hearings, supra note 159, at Summary. See Sherris, supra note 158.
162. Hearings, supra note 159, at 1. The second principal concern of the title indus-
try centers on whether the Justice Department has complied with all legal forfeiture
requirements for the transfer of clear title. The industry is not willing to insure against
the risk of constitutional challenges to the forfeiture procedures generally, or to the pro-
priety of the procedure that was followed in a particular case. According to the title
industry, the Justice Department has not been willing to guarantee that it would reim-
burse injured innocent parties for any title defects that arose because of its processing of
the forfeiture. These risks are considered to be extraordinary and the title industry is not
willing to accept them. Id. at 2.
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illegal act, the lender's interest will not be recognized. 63 Accord-
ing to the American Land Title Association's General Counsel,
the Department of Justice has not been willing to issue a defini-
tive policy statement making it clear that the government will
not apply the relation-back provision to injure innocent parties
with interests in the property being forfeited."" The general po-
sition of the Department of Justice has had a significant impact
on the attitude of the title industry toward undertaking the risk
of insuring title out of the government after property has been
forfeited.' Consequently, the industry has been very reluctant
to insure title for purchasers of the forfeited property. 6"
The ramifications of this reluctance, according to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office report, are that properties offered for sale
by the government often were withdrawn, or the sales were can-
celled or significantly delayed before going to settlement.' 7 One
reason for the delays was the purchasers' inability to obtain the
title insurance coverage required by the mortgagee.6 ' For exam-
ple, because of title defects, only two of twenty-three properties
for which sales offers were accepted went to settlement within
the sixty days specified in the sales contract. 69 The report of the
General Accounting Office recognizes the title industry's con-
cerns as valid, and recommends that the Attorney General "con-
sider alternative measures for resolving title insurance compa-
nies' reluctance to insure forfeited real properties." 7 '
G. Post-Seizure Interest
Another consideration relevant to the forfeiture of real
property is that the government, on a number of occasions, has
chosen not to contest forfeiture of the principal amount claimed




167. Id. at 5.
168. Id. at 6. Title insurance could not be obtained because the Department of Jus-
tice could not demonstrate to the satisfaction of title insurers that it had clear title to
the property. The other reason for the delays was that the Department of Justice had
not complied with all of the forfeiture requirements. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 9.
1990]
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by a lienholder,'17 1 but has consistently challenged the claims to
post-seizure interest and other charges permitted under the loan
document. 172 Thus, although a mortgage lender asserting an in-
nocent owner defense to forfeiture may sometimes not be chal-
lenged for the principal due on the mortgage, the lender still
faces the problem of being denied any claim to its property after
the date of seizure. 173
The issue of post-seizure interest has been a subject of
much controversy among district courts. 7 4 The leading case
holding that an innocent lienholder is not entitled to post-
seizure interest is United States v. One Piece of Real Estate.1 75
This case involved consolidated forfeiture actions in which the
government sought to have various parcels of real property for-
feited from their legal owners because the parcels were pur-
chased with proceeds from illegal drug transactions.1 76 Several
institutional lienholders sought to recover unpaid principal,
post-seizure interest, and other charges permitted under their
171. See United States v. 8.4 Acres of Land, 648 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd,
823 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1987)(mortgage lenders had no knowledge or reason to believe any
illegal activity traceable to the secured property had occurred and were considered inno-
cent owners); United States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D.
Tex. 1983)(government conceded that lienholders were entitled to unpaid principal and
interest up until date of seizure).
172. For cases in which the government has challenged post-seizure interest, see
United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel of Real Estate, 650 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (E.D. La.
1987); 8.4 Acres of Land, 648 F. Supp. at 83; United States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88,
89 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
173. The denial of post-seizure interest can cause significant injury to a mortgage
lender when one considers the enormous delays involved between the time of seizure and
the time of the sale of these properties by the government. Such delays can be divided
into two categories: (1) The delay between seizure and initiation of forfeiture proceed-
ings; and (2) the delay between the offering of forfeited property for sale by the govern-
ment and the actual settlement. For examples of the delay between seizure and forfei-
ture proceedings, see United States v. United States Treasury Bills, 750 F.2d 900 (11th
Cir. 1985)(fourteen-month delay); United States v. $18,505.10, 739 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1984) (twenty-six-month delay); United States v. Oil Screw Gulf Princess II, 543 F. Supp.
1037 (D.S.C. 1982) (four-month delay). For an example of the delay between the offering
of sale and the settlement, see Hearings, supra note 159, at 6 (two-year delay). For a
general discussion of delays in instituting proceedings, see Darmstadter, Some Constitu-
tional and Practical Considerations of Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHITTIER
L. REV. 27 (1987).
174. United States v. Real Property Titled in the Name of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332, 335 (D. Haw. 1987).
175. 571 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
176. Id. at 724.
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promissory notes.177 The court held that an innocent lienholder,
though entitled to receive principal and interest accruing up un-
til the time of seizure, was not entitled to receive interest or
other charges accruing after the seizure. 78
The One Piece of Real Estate court looked at the adminis-
trative practices prior to the enactment of the innocent owner
provision which consisted of the granting of remissions under
the discretion of the Attorney General."' The Attorney General
has consistently adopted the position that a lienholder's interest
is cut off as of the date of seizure. 80 The court noted that al-
though these interests are now statutorily protected, whereas in
the past relief was granted as a matter of "executive grace," this
administrative practice has been in effect for many years.8 '
Thus, Congress' failure to provide some guidelines for the grant-
ing of interest beyond the date of seizure was persuasive evi-
dence that it was the intent of Congress that innocent owners
were to receive the same relief and protection under the statute
as they had received for years in the administrative process."8 2
The court noted that since Congress has the power to provide
for the payment of post-seizure interest, it would not grant relief
beyond what is expressly provided for by the statute. 8 '
The most recent district court decision rejecting the reason-
ing of the One Piece of Real Estate court is United States v.
Parcel of Real Property Known as 708-710 West 9th Street.'
This court held that "where a forfeited property is encumbered
by a lien which encompasses a right to receive continuing inter-
est payments, an innocent lienholder is entitled to collect from
the government such interest as accrues until the principal is
177. Id.
178. Id. at 725. The holding in this case has been followed in United States v. A Fee
Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (E.D. La. 1987); United States
v. 8.4 Acres of Land, 648 F. Supp. 79, 83 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 549 (4th Cir.
1987); United States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88, 89 (S.D. Fla. 1984). See United States
v. One Condominium Apartment, 636 F. Supp. 457, 458 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
179. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. at 725.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 726.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 715 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Pa. 1989), vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989)(hearsay




repaid."'18 5 The court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would
give the United States the benefit of an interest-free loan at the
expense of the mortgage lender.'86 Since the United States had
been accumulating rental income on the property for its man-
agement and maintenance, "it is particularly disingenuous for
[the United States] to argue that it should not be required to
pay the interest on the mortgage. "187
III. Analysis
The forfeiture of drug-related property is penal in nature,
especially as applied to real property,1 88 and yet the government
is free to proceed under a civil or criminal forfeiture theory. 189
Since these proceedings demand different burdens of proof, an
incongruous result occurs. For instance, within the same factual
setting, an innocent interest holder can be required to meet a
significantly greater standard of proof to successfully contest
forfeiture simply because the government elected to follow civil
forfeiture procedures rather than criminal procedures. 90 In a
civil proceeding, the claimant must overcome two obstacles.
First, the claimant must show that he was unaware of the illegal
activity. Second, the claimant must bear the more difficult bur-
den of showing that he had taken affirmative steps to do every-
thing reasonably possible to avoid the illegal use of his property.
In a criminal proceeding, on the other hand, the claimant merely
must establish that he was a bona fide purchaser without any
suspicion of the illegal activity.' 9' To ensure protection of real
property rights, claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings must be
required to satisfy the same burden of proof in both civil and
185. Id. at 1326. Accord United States v. Real Property Titled in the Name of
Shashin, Ltd., 680 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D. Haw. 1987); United States v. All that Tract and
Parcel of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307, 313 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
186. Parcel of Real Property Known as 708-710 West 9th St., 715 F. Supp. at 1326.
187. Id. See Real Property Titled in the Name of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F. Supp. at
336. Under a typical loan agreement, the lender is entitled to receive interest until the
loan is paid in full. To compel the claimant to accept anything less than what the agree-
ment calls for would "fly in the face of the statute." Id.
188. Sinoway, supra note 22, at 115.
189. United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 395 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
190. Sinoway, supra note 22, at 115.
191. For a definition of a bona fide purchaser, see infra note 196. For a discussion of
the criminal standard, see infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
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criminal forfeiture proceedings. 192 Requiring the same burden of
proof in both civil and criminal real property forfeiture actions
would protect innocent owners from the unfettered discretion of
the government as to the requisite burden of proof.'93 in addi-
tion, the criminal standard effectuates the purpose of forfeiture
more fairly than does the civil standard. There is a "public in-
terest in the need for certainty in title and in the protection of
the rights of innocent owners," 19" and this interest will be served
by requiring civil claimants to show only that they were bona
fide purchasers with no suspicion of illegal activity.
A. The Criminal Standard
A criminal forfeiture is an in personam action against the
owner of the seized property. 95 A third party claimant who had
acquired an interest in the property subsequent to the illegal use
may challenge the forfeiture under section 853(c) by showing
that he was a bona fide purchaser for value with no reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing.'96 In United States v. Reckmeyer, 97 a
192. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a),(c) (1988). This statute provides in part:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter ... shall forfeit to the
United States... ;
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation;
(c) Third party transfers
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) ... vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under
this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other
then the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and there-
after shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee estab-
lishes ... that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the
time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture under this section.
Id.
193. Sinoway, supra note 22, at 15.
194. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate on Fellows Tract, 715 F. Supp. 360,
363 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). See supra note 192 for the text of this provision.
196. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). "A Bona Fide Purchaser (BFP) is an innocent party
who: (1) gives something of legal value in exchange for proceeds, and (2) has no knowl-
edge that what he is acquiring is connected to drug trafficking." DRUG GUIDE, supra note
29
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father petitioned to recover certain property forfeited to the
United States as a result of his son's conviction.19 The court
stated that it was Congress' intent to provide standing for all
creditors to make claims, and that Congress did not intend to
apply the criminal forfeiture statute "in such a manner as would
cause such great hardship to innocent persons in violation of
their constitutional rights, while also leading to erroneous results
in a large number of cases." 199 The court held that a creditor
need only establish that a bona fide obligation did exist between
the creditor and the defendant, and that the creditor had no
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.200 "Any narrower interpre-
tation of legal right[s], title, or interests in Section 853 ... would
likely render the statute unconstitutional. This procedure will
help insure that the primary statutory purpose to punish the de-
fendant will be effectuated without unfairly punishing innocent
third persons. 2
0 1
B. Similarities Between Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
The criminal burden of proof should be used in civil forfei-
ture proceedings against real property because all forfeiture pro-
ceedings are "quasi-criminal in character. ' 20 2 Forfeiture under
any statute is a highly punitive sanction, long disfavored by the
common law.203 Moreover, the forfeiture statutes are not
designed to "punish without fault. 204 In reality, the goal of for-
feiture, whether in a civil or in a criminal proceeding, is to pe-
nalize for the commission of an unlawful offense.2 °5
1, at 116.
197. 628 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1986).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 621.
200. Id. at 622.
201. Id.
202. One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). For an in-depth
comparison of the similarities between civil and criminal forfeiture, see DRUG GUIDE,
supra note 1, at 270.
203. See, e.g., United States v. One Rockwell Aero Commander, 671 F.2d 414, 417
(10th Cir. 1982).
204. United States v. Edwards, 368 F.2d 722, 724 (4th Cir. 1960)(quoting United
States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 236 (1939)).
205. Sinoway, supra note 22, at 115. See Comment, Due Process Implications of
Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising out of Illegal Drug
Transactions, 1984 DUKE L. J. 822, 830 (forfeiture device punishes individuals who use
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In determining whether civil actions are so penal in nature
as to require criminal trial safeguards, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Ward"' established a two-part analysis. First,
did Congress denominate the sanction in question as civil in na-
ture? Second, even if Congress affixed a civil label, is the statute
nonetheless so punitive in nature as to require constitutional
protections ordinarily applicable in criminal proceedings?0.
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,'" the
United States instituted an in rem action for forfeiture of fire-
arms.2 0 9 The Court used the two-part test established in Ward
to decide whether the forfeiture sanction was intended to be, or
was by its nature, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial. 0
Since the firearms forfeiture provision required an in rem pro-
ceeding, the first inquiry from Ward was necessarily answered in
the affirmative. 11 "In contrast to the in personam nature of
criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed
as civil proceedings .... 1
In turning to the second prong of the Ward inquiry, the
Court addressed a list of "helpful" considerations as established
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.2" This list includes such fac-
tors as whether the sanction was penal in nature, whether it was
their property to perpetrate criminal activity).
206. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
207. Id. at 248.49.
208. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
209. Id. at 355. The firearms were seized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1989).
This statute prohibits knowingly engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without
a license. Id.
210. Id. at 362-63.
211. Id. at 363. The forfeiture provision in this case incorporated the Internal Reve-
nue Code which provides that actions to enforce forfeiture shall be in rem proceedings.
Id.
212. Id.
213. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Kennedy Court enumerated the test traditionally ap-
plied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the al-






excessive, and whether it served the traditional criminal law
goals of deterrence and retribution.21' The Court, in One Assort-
ment of Firearms, held that the firearm forfeiture statute215 was
intended to be civil and remedial, finding that an analysis of
these factors "in no way undermines Congress' classification of
the § 922(d) forfeiture action as a civil sanction. 216
In United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency,217
the Second Circuit applied the Ward and Mendoza-Martinez
tests directly to section 881.218 The court rejected the claimant's
contention that since forfeiture under this statute constitutes
criminal punishment, an allocation of the burden of proof on the
claimant violates due process.219 The court justified this conclu-
sion by finding that Congress "expressly and impliedly" indi-
cated a preference for the civil label.220 In performing the second
level of the analysis, the court inquired whether the forfeiture
involved was so punitive in purpose as to override Congress' in-
tention to enact a civil penalty.2 ' The court concluded that
since section 881 has many remedial purposes other than the
punishment of drug offenders, it is not criminal punishment and
can be administered civilly.222
On closer analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, how-
ever, it appears that many of the considerations established in
that test are present in section 881.223 First, this sanction is pe-
nal and involves an affirmative disability since a claimant's
214. Id. at 168-69.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988).
216. One Assortment of Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366.
217. 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
218. Id. at 12-13.




Forfeiture of drugs, vehicles and money used in drug trafficking has many appar-
ent remedial, non-punitive [sic] purposes. These include impeding the success of
the criminal enterprise by eliminating its resources and instrumentalities, dimin-
ishing the efficiency and profitability of the business by increasing the costs and
risks associated with it, and helping to finance the government's efforts to combat
drug trafficking.
Id.
223. Darmstadter, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil For-
feiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHIwrIER L. REV. 27, 49 (1987).
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property is to be taken from him without compensation.2 2 Sec-
ond, the criminal law aims of deterrence and retribution are be-
ing promoted.125 Third, section 881 applies to behavior that is
already a crime - drug trafficking.220 Fourth, the sanction, as
applied to innocent third parties, appears excessive. 27 This last
factor has been interpreted to require an analysis of whether a
less burdensome alternative exists to accomplish the stated goals
of the legislation. 228 The less burdensome alternative to requir-
ing a claimant to show that he did everything reasonably possi-
ble to avoid the illegal use of his property would be to regard
section 881 proceedings as "quasi-criminal" and thus require a
claimant to merely show that he was a bona fide purchaser who
was reasonably without suspicion.229 If the government could re-
fute this showing, then forfeiture would not appear excessive2 3
The numerous similarities between civil and criminal forfeiture,
the inherent penal nature of forfeiture actions, and the impor-
tance of protecting real property rights support the contention
that the claimant should only be required to bear the criminal
burden of proof to produce a fair result in real property civil
forfeiture proceedings.
Moreover, requiring the claimant to carry a lesser burden in
civil proceedings would not defeat Congress' goal of attacking
the economic power bases of drug traffickers since Congress
could provide for substitute property to be forfeited as is pro-
224. Id. at 50.
225. Id. "The fact that seizure serves to impede drug traffic, and therefore bestows a
benefit upon society, is incidental to [the promotion of deterrence and retribution] and
may be viewed as nothing more than a form of general deterrence." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. "This determination concentrates on other potential goals and benefits that
forfeiture would promote, while considering whether the punitive element of the statute
is so strong that these other goals should be achieved through another legislative mecha-
nism." Id.
229. Id. See supra note 192.
230. Norman Siegel, Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union,
summed up his view of civil forfeiture by recalling a line from an old Western: " 'First
we'll hang him. Then we'll give him a fair trial.' " Siegel feels that forfeiture laws are
used as a form of summary punishment by prosecutors without having satisfied their
burden of proof. Pinsley, Putting Sharper Teeth in Forfeiture Law, MANHATTAN LAW-




vided in the criminal forfeiture statute 3 Section 853(p)(2) of
the criminal statute allows the government to seize substitute
property and subject it to forfeiture when the criminal transfers
an interest in property to an innocent third party3 2 solely to
avoid forfeiture. 33
In addition, the relation-back doctrine must not be used to
defeat the claims of innocent owners who acquired property af-
ter the illegal act. The legislative history surrounding the inno-
cent owner provision is evidence that a bona fide purchaser has
standing to contest forfeiture regardless of when the interest
arose.2 34 By not allowing the relation-back doctrine to defeat in-
nocent owner standing, many of the concerns expressed by the
title insurance industry will be alleviated.233 Moreover, the line
of reasoning which upholds an innocent owner's right to receive
post-seizure interest must also be followed.236 Since the civil for-
feiture statute provides that "no property shall be forfeited...
to the extent of the interest of any owner,"2 to compel a claim-
ant to accept anything less than the principal plus interest and
costs until the loan is paid in full would "fly in the face of the
statute."2 38
Thus, the government can still fight its war against drug
abuse by attacking the economic power bases of drug traffickers
231. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988). This section provides:
If any of the property described in subsection (a) of this section, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendant-
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty;
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to
the value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
Id.
232. An innocent third party is one who is a bona fide purchaser for value without
reasonable suspicion. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
233. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(2)(1988).
234. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
237. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
238. United States v. Real Property Titled in the Name of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332, 336 (D. Haw. 1987).
[Vol. 10:485
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/12
CIVIL FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY
without injuring innocent interest holders. Through these proce-
dural changes the government's objective to combat drug traf-
ficking, as well as its interest in preventing unfairness to prop-
erty owners, will be equally served.
IV. Conclusion
Requiring the claimant to show only that he was a bona fide
purchaser reasonably without suspicion would enable the courts
to take into account whether forfeiture would effect a dispropor-
tionate penalty. Mandating that a criminal procedure be fol-
lowed within section 881 forfeitures would draw attention to the
question of whether the punishment fits the crime. An owner
who does not suspect that his property is being misused does not
have a duty to prevent alleged wrongdoing. Such an owner has
inherently done all that could reasonably be expected to ensure
that property was not misused. Accordingly, the innocent owner
is entitled to the return of his property unless the government
can refute the owner's claim of innocence.
In addition to the change in the standard necessary to show
innocence, the relation-back doctrine and the post-seizure inter-
est issue must be addressed. The government must be willing to
recognize all claims by bona fide purchasers and ensure that re-
gardless of the time that the interest arose, the full interest in
the property will be upheld. If these changes are put into effect,
civil forfeiture of real property will be a more effective weapon
to combat crime, and this weapon will not injure innocent
owners.
Patricia M. Canavan
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